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Implementation of the National Ocean
Policy:
Lessons from New England
Anne Hayden*
INTRODUCTION

In 2010, President Barack Obama established, through
executive order, the nation's first national ocean policy. The
implementation of the policy is intended to replace two hundred
years of ad hoc policy development with a comprehensive
approach to ocean governance; one that will provide guidance for
the use, development, and protection of the US Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), coordinate the marine related efforts of
myriad governmental agencies, and limit use conflicts among the
growing demands for our ocean resources. To some degree,
establishment of a national ocean policy represents a restatement
of federal authority over the EEZ, first codified in the passage of
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) in 1976.
As such, it risks reinforcing assumptions regarding the efficacy of
rationalized management that have hindered the conservation
and restoration of fish stocks in the Northeast and that are
unlikely to result in effective maritime multiple use management.
* Consultant in natural resource management, research and policy. Ms.
Hayden has extensive experience working with state and federal agencies
and nonprofit organizations on issues of resource use and conservation. She
is a doctoral candidate in Interdisciplinary Studies at University of Maine, an
Adjunct Lecturer in Environmental Studies at Bowdoin College, and a
columnist for National Fisherman magazine.
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New England's fisheries crisis and recent ocean planning
initiatives provide insights regarding effective implementation of
the National Ocean Policy.
The twentieth century saw the rise of science as a way of
understanding the natural world and the development of
professional resource management as the most appropriate
mechanism for both optimizing natural production for human use
and resolving issues of over and misuse of natural resources. The
prevailing view was deterministic and assumed that the natural
world operated as a steady state: science need only to understand
the mathematical relationships underlying natural processes in
order to manipulate such processes for the benefit of mankind.
The concept of maximum sustainable yield, the basis for much of
our current fisheries management paradigm, sprang from this
well.
FEDERALIZATION OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Impetus for passage of the FCMA, passed in 1976, included
the desire to capture the economic benefits of rich coastal shelf
fisheries for Americans rather than foreigners, the need to restore
stocks depleted by foreign fishing fleets, an interest in
incentivizing expansion of domestic fishing fleets, and the belief
that recently developed principles of scientific management could
be applied to maximize the benefits of fisheries. Absent fishing
pressure from foreign fleets, stocks began to recover only to be
decimated in turn by the newly capitalized American fishing fleet.
Attempts to address the failure of management to stabilize
harvests include several amendments to the FCMA, among the
most significant of which were the Sustainable Fisheries Act of
1996, in which the FCMA was renamed the Magnuson-Stevens
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), and the
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006.
Each sought to address the
weaknesses of the Act by further privileging the role of science in
setting management targets and by establishing legally
enforceable standards for preventing overharvesting and for
rebuilding fish stocks.
LESSONS LEARNED
Several developments in the decades since the rise to
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prominence of federalized professional natural resource
management now challenge the current management paradigm
and suggest alternatives to the top down, data-driven approach
currently embodied in the MSFCMA.
First, research on the structure of groundfish stocks in New
England has revealed that previous assumptions about the wellmixed nature of such stocks are unfounded. Rather than being
part of one large stock, as assumed during implementation of the
FCMA, groundfish stocks in the Gulf of Maine are now known to
be comprised of a series of substocks.1 Broad-scale stock
assessments and fishery management plans fail to recognize and
therefore to protect many of these substocks. Second, ecologists
now view ecosystems as complex and dynamic rather than as
functioning as a series of steady state equilibria. Interactions
across temporal and spatial ecological scales introduce
irresolvable uncertainty into ecosystem dynamics confounding the
efforts to predict stock abundance that have been the foundation
of professional resource management. While the concept of
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) has been useful as a teaching
tool, its limitations as a regulatory tool have been well
documented. 2 Questions regarding the utility of MSY as a
regulatory tool were raised even as the FCMA was being
implemented.3 Third, it is now accepted that humans are part of
the ecosystem. The logistic, surplus production models that are
the basis of our current fisheries management paradigm define
the role of fishermen in terms of a simplistic fishing mortality
factor. Fishing behavior is understood to be a complex function of
many elements, including market prices, operating costs,
availability of capital, opportunity costs, fishers' ecological
knowledge, cultural practices, as well as the effect of regulations
on all of the above. Not only are fishermen part of the ecosystem
but fisheries managers, consumers, and competing marine users,
including
recreational
fishermen,
environmentalists,
aquaculturists, and, more recently, energy interests, all play a role
1. See Edward P. Ames, Atlantic Cod Stock Structure in the Gulf of
Maine, 29 FISHERIES 10, 16 (2004).
2. See e.g., Carmel Finley, The Social Constructionof Fishing, 1949, 14
ECOLOGY & Soc'Y (2009).
3. See P.A. Larkin, An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum
SustainableYield, 106 TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 1, 4-5 (1977).
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in affecting the dynamics of marine ecosystems, directly or
indirectly. Fourth, research regarding common property resources
has shown that Garrett Hardin's assertion that only privatization
or government regulation can prevent tragedies of the commons
represents a false dichotomy.4 Studies have documented myriad
examples of cooperation among user groups to sustain the use of
common property resources: most limit access to the resource, a
possibility not anticipated by Hardin. 5 Finally, federal fisheries
management has failed in New England to restore or protect
many fish stocks; as a result, thousands of fishermen have lost
their livelihoods and communities all along the New England
coast have shifted from economies based on diverse fisheries to
dependence on lobster fishing and tourism.
While it is clear that overharvesting, well underway by the
time the FCMA was passed, caused the collapse of New England's
groundfish stocks, it is less well understood that federal policies
contributed to the overharvesting that occurred after the FCMA
was implemented.
Just as Hardin could not imagine that
individual users could agree among themselves to limit resource
use, current management paradigms assume that fishermen act
only as individuals pursuing their own self-interest. Focus on
single species management and regulation undercuts the
conservation incentive of small-scale diversified fisheries by
reinforcing a shift to larger scale, "roving bandit" fisheries. 6
Management at the scale of the Gulf of Maine allowed open access
on substocks resulting in local extirpations and sharply reducing
the viability of the small boat fleet. Historical analysis reveals
that such substocks at one time collectively supported groundfish
landings in the Gulf of Maine an order of magnitude higher than
now occurs, all landed with sail powered vessels using hook and
line technology.7 While some groundfish stocks in the Gulf of
Maine are showing signs of recovery, federal policies limit the
4. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243,
1247 (1968).
5.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION passim (1990).

6.

See James A. Wilson, Matching Social and Ecological Systems in

Complex Ocean Fisheries, 11 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y (2006).

7.

See Ames, supra note 1, at 22; Karen E. Alexander et al., Gulf of

Maine Cod in 1861: HistoricalAnalysis of Fishery Logbooks, with Ecosystem
Implications, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 428, 444 (2009).
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likelihood that stocks can be restored to historical levels.
AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT

Implementation of the National Ocean Policy presents an
opportunity to reframe our approach to management of federal
waters to reflect advances in our understanding of the interaction
between resource users and marine ecosystems. An effective
approach reinvisions the interactions of humans and the marine
environment as socio-ecological systems.8
Such an approach
replaces a vision of management as exogenous manipulation of
ecosystem components with one that acknowledges the complex
and multi-scalar interdependence of social and ecological
processes.
Prescriptive management is replaced by an iterative process
of trial and error known as adaptive management: management
actions are implemented at a variety of scales (taking into account
cross-scale linkages), social and natural systems are monitored for
effects, and the results applied to the timely adjustment of
management strategies.
An adaptive approach allows for
management to adjust not only to unanticipated changes within
the system, but also to the effects of exogenous forces such as
climate change and market forces.
Effective management must also reflect the social behavior
that emerges as a result of user groups' interactions with marine
ecosystems.
Co-management, in which government shares
authority for oversight of resource management with resource
users, has been shown to be effective in creating incentives for
user groups to share data, cooperate within the group to achieve
conservation goals, and increase compliance with regional and
federal requirements. Matching the scale of co-management to
the scale of the resource and allowing users a role in decisionmaking regarding resource use ensures that users benefit from
their efforts to conserve, and increases incentives for meaningful
participation in management.
From an integrated, socio-ecological perspective, natural
resource management is recognized as at least as much as a
problem of social organization as one of science. Management that
8.
NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR
COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE 3 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 2003).
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is adaptive and collaborative builds on institutions, rules, and

norms, integrating user social structure into the management
process.9

One of the most challenging aspects of establishing adaptive
co-management of natural resources is that it is not effectively
imposed on a socio-ecological system but must be allowed to
emerge from the interactions of user groups operating at the scale
of the ecosystem properties on which they depend.' 0 The
MSFCMA prescribed co-management of fisheries, establishing
regional councils designed to provide industry input into
regulations. The council system has failed to protect stocks
because the scale of management does not reflect the ecological
scale of the stocks and because the council appointment process
and operating rules are unrelated to the social organization of
New England's fishing industry.

(A recent effort to reform

management to reflect social organization among fishermen is
described below.) Co-management is not a panacea for effective
management of common property resources;" however, it does
provide opportunities for incentivizing conservation among users
that would otherwise be lost.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY

Plans for implementation of the National Ocean Policy focus
on coordination of government agencies, scientific research, and
coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) as the means for
achieving effective, comprehensive, ecosystem-based ocean
management.12 For the purposes of CMSP, the nation's marine
waters are divided into nine regions, parallel to, but independent
of, the jurisdictions of the MSFMCA's fishery management
councils (with the addition of a council representing the Great
9.

See Derek R. Armitage et al., Adaptive Co-Management for Social-

Ecological Complexity, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 95, 100 (2009); Timothy

R. McClanahan et al., Healing Small-Scale Fisheries by FacilitatingComplex
Socio-EcologicalSystems, 19 REV. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIEs 33, 42 (2009).

10. Jack Ruitenbeek & Cynthia Cartier, The Invisible Wand: Adaptive
Co-Management as an Emergent Strategy in Complex Bio-economic Systems
33 (Ctr. for Int'l Forestry Research, Occasional Paper No. 34, 2001).
11. Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas,
104 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Scl. 15176, 15177 (2007).
12. THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASKFORCE 28 (2010).
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Lakes). The goal of the National Ocean Policy is to coordinate the
ocean-related actions of a wide range of government agencies;
however, as planned, implementation of the policy is silent on how
regional ocean planning will engage with previously established
fisheries management and offshore energy licensing programs.
Proposals to implement CMSP in New England describe a
science-driven effort that includes public participation and
outreach to user groups.13 As envisioned, CMSP treats users as
outside the decision-making process, privileges science over users'
ecological knowledge, and establishes large regions as the
appropriate scale for management. These constraints are likely to
limit meaningful participation by users in the planning process
and hinder emergence of adaptive co-management.
Three initiatives in New England illustrate opportunities for
incorporating principles of adaptive co-management into federal
ocean planning.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
developed an ocean management plan for state waters. Designed
to reduce use conflicts and inform review of projects requiring
state and federal permits, the plan is the first comprehensive
effort in the nation to manage state waters. Federal agencies,
such as the United States Geological Survey, participated in
mapping resources of state interest for incorporation in the plan.
The State of Rhode Island recently adopted a management plan
for adjacent offshore waters. Driven by proposals for development
of wind power, the plan represents Rhode Island's interests in,
and knowledge of, waters off its coast. The plan is the first to
have been recognized by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.
Adoption of catch shares as a fisheries
management tool in New England illustrates effective stakeholder
participation at an even finer scale. The New England Fishery
Management Council recently adopted an amendment to the
groundfish management plan that allows for self-organization of
fishermen into groups for the purpose of jointly managing fishing
activities. The process, which allocates a percentage of the total
allowable catch to each group, provides fishermen with the
incentive to target high value fish, avoid by-catch and reduce
13. NORTHEAST REGIONAL OCEAN COUNCIL, ADvANCING COASTAL AND
MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING IN THE NORTHEAST: NORTHEAST REGIONAL OCEAN
COUNCIL (NROC) PROPOSAL To NOAA (December 10, 2010).
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habitat impacts. The amendment was approved by the National
Marine Fisheries Service. The role of the federal government in
each of these three initiatives is a model for incorporation of finer
scale, stakeholder driven input into a broad scale, federal
planning effort.
CONCLUSION

Federal rationalization of American fisheries offers several
lessons that should be heeded in implementation of the National
Ocean Policy. With its focus on nine regional ocean councils and
CMSP, implementation appears poised to replicate the same
broad-scale, data driven approach that underlies the MSFCMA.
As proposed, the National Ocean Policy does not preclude
incorporation of mechanisms that would allow for development of
adaptive co-management, including opportunities for identifying
resources at a variety of ecological scales and allowing for the
emergence of scale-related institutions that share authority and
responsibility for management among federal, regional and local
scales of governance. However, implementation will need to be
modified in order to capture the potential benefits of adaptive comanagement. To the extent that implementation builds on outdated assumptions regarding the primacy of science, professional
management, and federalization of oversight, it is likely to limit
the productivity of, and the collective benefits to be derived from,
our nation's coastal and marine resources.

